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Mr Chairman, Distinguished Representatives:  The University of London∗ greatly 
appreciates the opportunity to address this BWC Meeting of Experts.  
 
With other academic colleagues and representatives of governments and civil society 
we were glad to take part in the commemorative event on 30 March 2015 which 
marked the 40th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention.  That 
commemoration gave States Parties an opportunity to commit themselves afresh to 
sustained actions in support of biological disarmament.  Sustaining the BWC in the 
years ahead requires much hard work to be done behind the scenes both here in 
Geneva and in capitals. We recognise the ‘invisible’ work that produced the BWC 
and that remains needed today to uphold the BWC and make it work better in the 
interests of all.  That applies to every one of the items on the agenda of the Meeting 
of Experts, which this statement will address. 
  
This is also the first BWC meeting after another anniversary: It is 90 years since the 
Geneva Protocol was signed on 17 June 1925.  We have used that anniversary to 
celebrate the Geneva Protocol as a crucial anchor for CBW arms control and the 
foundation on which the international legal architecture has been constructed to 
prohibit and prevent all CBW activity. Both treaties—BWC and CWC—complement 
the principles established in 1925.1 
 
Looking back over the history of the treaty-building processes, we recognise the 
contributions of many states and individuals determined to solve problems and 
overcome obstacles. The same tenacity of purpose and sustained effort in 
multilateral diplomacy will be just as necessary over the next forty years of the BWC 
as it was throughout the first forty, but increasingly this requires new or renewed 
engagement with non-state actors. 
  
Your standing agenda item on Strengthening National Implementation is key to 
how effectively all BW activity is both prohibited and prevented.  Although the legal 
framework of implementation varies from one State Party to another, as foreseen in 
Article IV, its stringency when applied must be effective worldwide with no gaps.  And 
that is why the sharing of national experience is so valuable.  Experiences, proposals 
and initiatives discussed here contribute to an international repertory of good 
practice.  This applies to education and awareness-raising, to codes of conduct for 
life scientists, to biosafety and biosecurity, as well as to legislative and administrative 
provisions which enforce the prohibitions of the BWC.  Your sessions devoted to this 
agenda item can benefit from the pooling of national experiences in more widely 
shared practices.  These are no threat to state sovereignty: On the contrary, there is 
much to be gained from international bio-risk standards and comparable procedures 
to strengthen national implementation. 
  
What is more, it should be possible to welcome a wide range of initiatives and 
include them in the documentation of the BWC, without necessarily conferring 
collective approval on every proposal or initiative mentioned.  The basic change of 
mind-set required is from seeking consensus by deletion to the harder but more 
rewarding pursuit of consensus by inclusion.  If such a change of mind-set can be 
carried forward from this Meeting of Experts to the Meeting of States Parties in 
December, the delegations drafting the resulting Report may be less preoccupied 
with blocking opponents’ draft language and concentrate rather on searching for 
more widely acceptable language.  We encourage States Parties to be more 
inclusive. 
  
Turning next to Science and Technology (S&T), there is a strong case for 
upgrading the annual review of relevant S&T developments into an Open-Ended 
Working Group of a full week’s duration each year and with more adequate 
resources. This upgrading would be a major element in creating a robust and 
effective intersessional process at the Eighth Review Conference.2 However, within 
the constraints of the existing intersessional process, we hope your Meeting of 
Experts will make full use of the time allocated to this agenda item. The review of 
S&T has several aspects across the specified range of topics. Sharing knowledge is 
essential for the health of the BWC. So too is a comprehensive analysis of 
risk. Prudent and precautionary regulation of all activity in the life sciences is vital to 
confidence in the Convention, and this could well be the subject of recommendations 
going forward to the Meeting of States Parties. We draw your attention particularly to 
the relevance of gene-editing technologies and gain-of-function experiments.3,4  
  
On every agenda item this week we hope the Meeting of Experts will bear in mind 
the BWC’s overall need to find means of reassurance. This is where the BWC is 
weakest. Many efforts have been made to remedy this weakness and it is vital that 
they should continue. We particularly encourage the production of working papers 
and initiatives that cross the boundaries of the existing Groups and demonstrate 
imaginative solutions with wide-ranging support. All States Parties, and the wider 
world of civil society, need to be reassured in two respects: First, that everything their 
own and other governments are doing is consistent with their BWC obligations; and 
second, that all activity in the life sciences is regulated and conducted in ways that 
do not threaten the BWC or test its limits. Greater transparency in areas such as 
dual-use research of concern is to be commended. Information that really builds 
confidence needs to be identified and exchanged, and stronger mechanisms for 
declaring, documenting and demonstrating adherence to the Convention need to be 
developed.5 
  
Mr Chairman, Distinguished Representatives: We wish you a successful and 
productive week, and we thank you for your attention to our statement. 
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